We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8 37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.
INTRODUCTION
Vickrey's celebrated paper [13] starts with a graphical discussion of a mechanism for call markets where sellers submit their privately known supply curves and buyers submit their privately known demand curves to an``exclusive public marketing agency.'' Vickrey, however, does not pursue this line of research further, but instead spares most of his pages for the discussion of auction mechanisms where there is only one seller who owns one indivisible item to be sold. Consequently, compared to the development of auction literature in the following decades, his discussion about double auction mechanism has not attracted much attention. In this paper, we (i) modify the Vickrey double auction mechanism by introducing the participation stage, and (ii) study the efficiency properties of the modified doi:10.1006Âjeth.2000.2736, available online at http:ÂÂwww.idealibrary.com on 572 0022-0531Â01 35.00 mechanism. We study the mechanism under the environment where each seller has one indivisible item to sell and each buyer wants to buy at most one item. We find that the Vickrey double auction is a direct generalization of Vickrey's second price auction to markets with both sides in the sense that there are two prices, the seller price and the buyer price, each of which can be interpreted as a second price.
Given the fixed set of potential sellers and buyers, Vickrey's proposed double auction mechanism is designed to achieve two properties, namely, efficiency and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. This mechanism, however, does not satisfy both budget balance and individual rationality if taken in its original form as he discusses. That is, the public marketing agency runs a deficit to achieve efficiency for the whole set of traders. One remedy to this problem is to collect participation fees from those traders who want to enter the mechanism. The main contribution of this paper is to explicitly analyze the entry decision of traders by introducing the participation stage, and study how well the modified Vickrey double auction performs in achieving efficiency under the additional requirement of budget balance and individual rationality.
We first provide sufficient conditions on the distributions of traders' valuations under which the modified Vickrey double auction satisfies efficiency, dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-ante budget balance, and interim individual rationality. The next result is about asymptotic efficiency. We show that, even though the traders' valuations are such that full efficiency cannot be achieved, the expected efficiency loss is bounded. This bound depends only on a parameter of the distribution functions, not on the number of traders. Consequently, the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency since the efficiency loss per trader is asymptotically zero.
2
The research on the efficiency of markets with private information has a long history and is too vast for us to overview the whole subject here. Therefore, we will discuss only a subset of the literature which is directly related to this paper, namely the double auction literature or the multilateral bargaining literature. Since the pioneering works of Chatterjee and Samuelson [1] and Myerson and Satterthwaite [9] on the bilateral bargaining situation where one seller has one indivisible item to sell and one buyer wants to buy that item, a series of papers have studied the multilateral bargaining situation, and various rules of trading have been 573 THE MODIFIED VICKREY DOUBLE AUCTION analyzed. There are k-double auctions (Wilson [15] , Gresik and Satterthwaite [3] , Leninger et al. [6] , Satterthwaite and Williams [11, 12] , and Rustichini et al. [10] ), the fixed price mechanism (Hagerty and Rogerson [5] ), and McAfee's dominant strategy double auction [8] . Of all these mechanisms, the modified Vickrey double auction is the only one that can achieve full efficiency. In addition, honesty is the only dominant strategy in the modified Vickrey double auction.
3 Therefore, the complexity of traders' decisions is dramatically reduced. 4 
MAIN RESULTS

The Mechanism
There is a set S=[1, ..., M] of sellers and a set B=[1, ..., N ] of buyers for a good. Each seller has one indivisible item to sell and each buyer wants to buy at most one item. Seller i 's privately known valuation for the good is denoted by c i , and buyer j 's privately known valuation for the good is denoted by b j . We impose the independence assumption throughout this paper. 
. By the Assumption, we have # s >0 and # b >0.
There is a third party who controls all the trades, whom we call the market maker.
5 Sellers and buyers first decide whether to participate in the mechanism by agreeing to pay a fee to the market maker. The participation fee for seller i is denoted by , s i and the participation fee for buyer j is denoted by , b j . Let the set of participating sellers (buyers) be S S (B B), and let m (n) be the number of participating sellers (buyers), i.e., |S | =m (|B| =n). Each participating seller, say seller i # S, submits an offer s i , and each participating buyer, say buyer j # B, submits a bid b j .
The volume and terms of trade of the modified Vickrey double auction is determined as follows. Sellers' offers are arrayed in increasing order, resulting in the order statistics s (1) s (2) } } } s (m) . Similarly, buyers' bids are arrayed in decreasing order, resulting in the order statistics b (1) 
If there is a tie, then it can be broken in any predetermined way. For convenience, we will follow the convention that
The volume of trade is determined as the number k such that s (k) b (k) and s (k+1) >b (k+1) . That is, the volume of trade k is max[} :
. A seller whose offer is one of s (1) , ..., s (k) and a buyer whose bid is one of b (1) , ..., b (k) can trade, and other participants cannot.
Each successful seller receives the same amount of money from the market maker, and the seller price is set as p
Similarly, each successful buyer pays the same amount of money to the market maker, and the buyer price is set as
The seller price p s is set to the best unsuccessful offer s (k+1) as long as this is lower than the worst successful bid b (k) ; otherwise it is set to the worst successful bid. Likewise, the buyer price p b is set to the best unsuccessful bid b (k+1) as long as this is higher than the worst successful offer s (k) ; otherwise it is set to the worst successful offer. In this respect, this mechanism is a generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction to markets with both sides. 6 It is easy to see that p 
Sufficient Conditions for Efficiency
Vickrey's fundamental insight was that it is each particpant 's dominant strategy in this mechanism to report hisÂher own true valuation. That is, honesty is each participant's dominant stragey for any sets S and B of participating sellers and buyers. Therefore, this mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible, and also efficient in the sense that all the potential gains from trade are realized. In fact, it is straightforward to check that the original Vickrey double auction without the participation stage is a member of the Vickrey Clarke Groves mechanisms. individual rationality. In our mechanism, the sum of participating sellers' receipts exceeds the sum of participating buyers' payments since p b p s . So budget balance will not be satisfied unless the market maker charges strictly positive fees to some participants. Then some traders may not enter the mechanism since they may find that their expected gains from trade do not cover the fee. Therefore, if we impose the budget balance requirement, then, although this mechanism is efficient for the participants, it may not be efficient for the whole set S _ B of traders. The main contribution of this paper is to study the properties of Vickrey double auction with the entry decision explicitly modeled. In other words, we analyze the efficiency properties of the Vickrey double auction with the additional requirement of budget balance and individual rationality. We first provide sufficient conditions for efficiency. Theorem 1. The modified Vickrey double auction satisfies efficiency, dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-ante budget balance, and interim individual rationality if one of the following conditions holds.
.
(ii) N>M and
Proof. See the Appendix. K When one of the conditions in Theorem 1 holds, then the market maker can charge ex-ante budget balancing fees in a way that all the potential traders enter the mechanism. Therefore, efficiency is achieved for S _ B. Theorem 1 is a straightforward extension of one of Williams's results [14, Theorem 4] , which discusses conditions for the existence of an efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible, ex-ante budget balancing, and interim individually rational mechanism for the double auction environment. Using the formulas derived in Williams [14] , Theorem 1 provides testable conditions in terms of the distributions. Note that the conditions in the theorem are easily satisfied for many distributions.
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KIHO YOON 8 The modified Vickrey double auction satisfies ex-ante budget balance if, for any S S and B B,
Example
The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency
Even when full efficiency cannot be achieved, 9 the expected efficiency loss of the modified Vickrey double auction is bounded. Let I(M, N ) be the expected efficiency loss (that is, the expected value of the unrealized gains from trade)
10 of the mechanism under the requirement of ex-ante budget balance and interim individual rationality. We have Theorem 2. For M, N 2,
Proof. See the Appendix. K Therefore, the expected efficiency loss per trader is of order 1Â(M+N). Although this theoretical bound for the rate of convergence to efficiency looks a little bit loose, the simulation result presented below suggests that the modified Vickrey double auction does not have a rate of order 1Â (M+N) 2 , as the k-double auction and McAffee's dominant strategy double auction have.
We provide a simulation result for the case when there are equal numbers of sellers and buyers, and sellers' and buyers' valuations are drawn from the uniform distribution on the unit interval. We compare the rate of convergence of the modified Vickrey double auction with those of other mechanisms in the literature. As seen from Table I , the modified Vickrey double auction performs worse than the k-double auction for this particular case. Though we provide the simulation result for this case in order to compare with existing simulation results, we want to emphasize that this does not necessarily imply that the modified Vickrey double auction performs worse generally. To make the point obvious, consider the case when the sufficient condition for full efficiency is satisfied. Then the modified Vickrey double auction performs definitely better then the k-double auction and McAfee's dominant strategy double auction, since the latter mechanisms cannot achieve full efficiency by their rules. , b ] then we cannot achieve full efficiency for any finite M and N. 10 See formula (7) below for a precise definition. Note. MVDA is the relative inefficiency of the modified Vickrey double auction when the participation fee is charged to both sides. The 0.5-DAL and 0.5-DAM are the relative inefficiencies of the least and the most inefficient equilibria of the 0.5-double auction, and DSA is the relative inefficiency of McAfee's dominant strategy double auction. MVDA is obtained by simulating 500,000 times for each M=N. The 0.5-DAL, 0.5-DAM, and DSA are from the corresponding papers.
In Table I , the relative inefficiency is the percentage value of the ratio of the total gains from trade unfulfilled under the mechanism to the total possible gains from trade. The column MVDA reports the relative inefficiency of the modified Vickrey double auction when the participation fee is charged to both sides. The columns 0.5-DAL and 0.5-DAM are the relative inefficiencies of the least and the most inefficient equilibria of the 0.5-double auction analyzed in Rustichini et al. [10] , and the column DSA is the relative inefficiency of the dominant strategy double auction of McAfee [8] . As Table I shows, the modified Vickrey double auction performs better than McAfee's mechanism for small numbers of traders, but does not do as well as the 0.5-double auction. Still, the inefficiency of the modified Vickrey double auction is quite negligible for large M=N.
A FINAL COMMENT
We defined ex-ante budget balance in the sense that the market maker's net payment after the fee collection is non-positive in expectation. (Please refer to footnote 8.) Alternatively, we can require that the market maker's net payment must be equal to zero in expectation. There are two implications from this change. First, the fee must be charged correctly reflecting the distribution functions, F, G under the strong version, i.e., the case when the equality holds, while the market maker has some freedom over the actual level of the fee under the weak version. Second, we implicitly count the market maker's profit (the negative of the net payment) as welfare under the weak version.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. We first derive a bound on the expected difference of the seller price and the buyer price.
. Now the expected gains from trade for a seller with valuation sÄ when all M sellers and N buyers participate in the mechanism are given by
where g M : N is the density function of the M th highest valuation out of N buyers' valuations. Likewise, the expected gains from trade for a buyer with valuation b Ä when all M sellers and N buyers participate in the mechanism are given by
where f N : M is the density function of the N th lowest valuation out of M sellers' valuations. Therefore, as is shown in Williams [14] , a necessary and sufficient condition for the mechanism to be efficient, ex-ante budget balancing, and interim individually rational is
Suppose condition (i) of Theorem 1 holds. Then, since U s =0 by (1), and
by (2), we have
by Lemma 1. The second case of Theorem 1 can be similarly proved. We finally note that inequality (3) cannot be satisfied if b
Proof of Theorem 2. We first prove for the case when M>N. We set ,
In words, the market maker charges a uniform participation fee only to buyers. Then it is clear that all the sellers enter the mechanism, i.e., S=S. Regarding who among the buyers will enter the mechanism with a strictly positive fee , b , we provide two lemmas below. First we have: Proof. We will first show that, for any given M, N, and , b , if b j enters the mechanism then b j with b j >b j will also enter. The reason is that the gain from participation is higher for b j than b j regardless of the number n of participating buyers and the realization of other participants' valuations.
To see this, fix the number of participating buyers and also fix the valuations of the sellers and those of the participating buyers except j. Now when j's valuation is b j , we can determine the volume of trade (k), the seller price ( p s ), and the buyer price ( p b ) by the rules of the mechanism. Let the corresponding quantities when j's valuation is b j be k , p~s, and p~b. We claim that the gain to b j is no less that that to b j . That is,
implies that k=k . This, together with the fact that neither b j nor
, we proved the claim.
The expected gain from participation is an expectation over all possible n and all possible realizations of valuations, and thus we conclude that if b j enters then b j with b j <b j also enters.
Next we show that, for any M, N, and , b , the set of participating types (valuations) is indeed in the form of the (left-) closed interval
. This follows from the continuity of the expected gain with respect to the valuation b j , and the usual assumption that j will participate if she is indifferent toward participation and non-participation. Proving continuity can be accomplished by proving the following claim.
Claim 2. For b j and b j with b j <b j , and for any n and any realization of other participants' valuations,
Proof. If b j b (k) , the LHS of (4) 
0. Therefore, we can adequately modify ;(, b ; M, N ) to be defined on R + as
Summarizing the discussion, we have Lemma 3. For any given M and N, (i) the participation strategy ;(, b ; M, N ) is an increasing functions of , b # R + , and is strictly increasing over 8, and
The market maker's gross expected payment when there are n participating buyers is at most 
